Tuesday, October 30, 2012

Nurturing of the Pakistan Plant



“Judge not by the glib words spoken with a forked tongue, judge by the actions that follow them.”

-         Anurupa Cinar

 

Hi, Everyone! In March 1940, the Muslim League made a formal demand for Pakistan. And by May 1940, Gandhi started talking with a forked tongue!

While researching Gandhi I have noticed he has a remarkable talent for expressing two opposing ideas and making them seem reasonable. The unpleasant point is made in a negative form and the one intended to be applauded, quoted, and publicized is made very positively.

I am giving a prime example of it below:

“‘As a man of nonviolence,’ he [Gandhi] observed, ‘I cannot forcibly resist the proposed partition if the Muslims of India really insist upon it.’”

That’s the negative form, and a euphemistic way of really saying he will accept Pakistan—for the Muslims in India were most certainly insisting upon it . . . !

In the next sentence he says:

“But I can never be a willing party to the vivisection. . . .”[1]

How very much this sentence been quoted . . . ! Though, even in that there is a catch, for he can claim to be an “unwilling” party to the vivisection. There’s his out.

See how it is? I intend to devote a whole post one day to highlighting many of Gandhi’s such double-talk.

Congress was certainly wishing to get rid of Jinnah. Pakistan plan was insidiously being spoken off in an agreeable way. Check out what Gandhi has to say— openly published in his Harijan —to an Englishman.

“While answering an Englishman, Gandhi replied in Harijan of May 4, 1940: ‘I would any day prefer Muslim rule to British rule. . . . The partition proposal had altered the face of Hindu-Muslim problem. . . .’ And he granted that “Pakistan cannot be worse than foreign domination.’”

And Keer further asks, as a comment on this flimflaming of Gandhi’s:

“Was it an explanation of his stand or a direction for the Muslim leaders to draw up their plans?”[2]

By 1942, Congress was done with these oblique references to accepting Pakistan. Jinnah and the Muslim League were becoming a big hindrance in their path. Viceroy Linlithgow was not entertaining their demands, especially ones that aimed at giving Congress sole power in free India. The Congress High Command now made a drastic, treacherous move.

“The Working Committee of the Indian National Congress proclaimed emphatically by a resolution at Delhi in April 1942, ‘that the Congress could not think in terms of compelling the people of any territorial unit to join the Indian Union against their declared and established will.’

This historic resolution brought into bold relief the fact that the Congress favoured the provinces with the right of self-determination or secession and such secession was called by the Muslims ‘Pakistan.’

Dealing with Congress resolution four years later, Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya had to admit: ‘It is evident that the passage concedes the division of India into more than one State and gives the go-by to the Unity and integrity of India.’[3]

Pakistan resolution was now passed by the Congress Working Committee . . . ! And that in April 1942—five years before Partition and independence.

The All-India Congress Committee, though, was as yet clueless re this treacherous resolution of their Working Committee.

Now the Congress High Command had to ensure that the A.I.C.C. too accepted the Pakistan resolution. Rajagopalachari set to work to do the deed.

“On 23 April 1942 Rajagopalachari managed to get two resolutions passed by the Congress members in the Madras legislature. The first recommended to the All-India Congress Committee (which was about to meet in Allahbad) that Congressmen should acknowledge the Muslim League’s claim for separation, should the same be persisted in when the time came for framing the constitution of India . . . The resolution urged that ‘to sacrifice the chances of the formation of a national government for the doubtful advantage of maintaining a controversy over the unity of India is the most unwise policy’ and that it had become necessary to choose the lesser evil. . . .

The Muslim League was naturally jubilant at its ideal of Pakistan having been brought down at last from the clouds of speculation to the level of practical politics . . .

The All-India Congress Committee, meeting in Allahabad on 29 April, rejected his resolution by an overwhelming majority and adopted a counter-resolution ‘that any proposal to disintegrate India by giving liberty to any component State or territorial unit to secede from the Indian Union or Federation will be detrimental to the best interests of the people of the different States and provinces and the country as a whole and the Congress, therefore, cannot agree to any such proposal.’”[4]

The Congress members were not in favor of their High Command’s sellout of the Motherland. They stated so, unequivocally in their resolution.

But the Congress High Command who were absolute dictators of the Congress (and had disregarded, overturned, and schemed against relatively minor issues) were not about to let their Delhi resolution of acceding Pakistan, upon which depended their getting total power in free India (or so they believed,) be swept away.

“Upon this Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif of Hyderabad asked Maulana Azad whether Jagat Narayan’s resolution had in any way modified or affected the Delhi resolution of the Working Committee. Maulana Azad in his letter of August 6, 1942, replied: ‘No part of the Delhi resolution to which you refer has in any way been affected or modified by any subsequent resolution of the A.I.C.C.’

 “To the same question of Dr. Latif, Jawaharlal Nehru also replied that Babu Jagat Narayan’s ‘resolution does not in any way override the Delhi Working Committee resolution.’”[5]

 
·       So the Congress Working Committee resolution acceding  Pakistan reigned supreme—as affirmed by the Congress dictators on August 6, 1942.

Read on to discover the Machiavellian timing of this Delhi resolution . . .

Anurupa



[1] Mahatma Gandhi, Dhananjay Keer, Page 682.
[2] Mahatma Gandhi, Dhananjay Keer, Page 682-683.
[3] Veer Savarkar, Dhananjay Keer, page 307.
[4] Transfer of Power, V. P. Menon, page 139.
[5]Mahatma Gandhi, Keer, page 700.

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